Oil, Automobiles, and the U.S. Economy: How Much have Things Really Changed? by Valerie A. Ramey & Daniel J. Vine
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES
OIL, AUTOMOBILES, AND THE U.S. ECONOMY:









The views expressed here are those of the authors and not those of the Board of Governors, or the
Federal Reserve System, or the National Bureau of Economic Research.  Sam Ackerman provided
excellent research assistance.  We are grateful for comments from Daron Acemoglu, Jordi Galí, George
Hall, James Hamilton, Chris Kurz, Ariel Pakes, and Garey Ramey, and we thank William Lee for sending
us his papers.  We also thank participants at the 2008 International Society for Inventory Research
session, the NBER Twenty-fifth Annual Conference on Macroeconomics, and seminar participants
at Statistics Canada and UC San Diego.  Valerie Ramey gratefully acknowledges financial support
from National Science Foundation grant SES-0617219 through the NBER.
NBER working papers are circulated for discussion and comment purposes. They have not been peer-
reviewed or been subject to the review by the NBER Board of Directors that accompanies official
NBER publications.
© 2010 by Valerie A. Ramey and Daniel J. Vine. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to
exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including
© notice, is given to the source.Oil, Automobiles, and the U.S. Economy:  How Much have Things Really Changed?
Valerie A. Ramey and Daniel J. Vine
NBER Working Paper No. 16067
June 2010, Revised July 2010
JEL No. E2,Q43
ABSTRACT
This paper studies the impact of oil shocks on the U.S. economy—and on the motor vehicle industry
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Between 2002 and mid-2008, the average real price of gasoline in the United 
States increased more than two fold after having risen only modestly in the preceding 15 
years.  Not surprisingly, this run-up led to renewed interest in the effects of oil shocks on 
the U.S. aggregate economy.  Hamilton’s (1983) seminal paper documented the negative 
effects of oil shocks on the aggregate economy, and numerous papers since that time 
have extended or questioned the strength of these effects.
1  Most recently, several authors 
have argued that the effects of oil price shocks on U.S. aggregate activity have declined 
since the mid 1980s (e.g. Herrera and Pesavento (2009), Blanchard and Galí (2010), 
Blanchard and Riggi (2009), Edelstein and Kilian (2009)).  These papers have variously 
attributed the decline to improved monetary policy, a smaller share of oil in production, 
or more flexible labor markets.  Empirical work has also shown that a more-muted 
response in the consumption of motor vehicles to energy price shocks has played a large 
role in obtaining these results (Edelstein and Kilian (2009)). 
This paper re-examines the extent to which the impact of oil shocks on the 
aggregate economy—and on the motor vehicle industry in particular—has changed over 
time.  We first discuss the array of energy cost measures that authors in the literature 
have used to define oil price shocks, and then we survey the theoretical contributions 
from a number of DSGE macro models that include various roles for oil in the economy. 
Using these models, there are a number of structural parameters that reasonably could 
                                                 
1 See, for example, Mork (1989), Hooker (1996), Hamilton (1996), Barsky and Kilian (2002), and 
Hamilton (2003). 
  2have changed over time and reduced the potency with which oil price fluctuations 
depress aggregate output. 
However, all of these macro models assume that the price of oil reflects the true 
cost of energy for firms and consumers.  While much of the recent empirical work uses 
published measures of oil and/or gasoline prices as an indicator of the strength of the oil 
price shocks, we find that these measures neglect the impact of the shortages that 
occurred in the critical 1973-74 and 1979 oil shock episodes due to price controls.     
Using two oil shock measures that include the effects of both price and non-price 
rationing, we re-examine the evidence from vector autoregressions that oil disturbances 
have had less impact on the real economy in the past twenty years than in the preceding 
decades.  The results show that the responses of motor vehicle consumption and 
aggregate output to shortage adjusted oil price shocks appear just as great during the past 
two and a half decades as they were in the 1970s and early 1980s.  On the other hand, 
even the new measures imply that the impact on nominal variables has become 
noticeably muted. 
Why has there been so little change over time in the response of motor vehicle 
consumption to oil price changes?  We find that, despite the many innovations in the way 
the U.S. economy produces and uses motor vehicles that have occurred over the past 40 
years, the primary channels through which oil prices directly affect motor vehicles have 
not changed much over time.  Namely, we present evidence that the recent increases in 
gasoline prices have caused just as much anxiety in consumers now as was observed 30 
years ago, and the shifts in demand across vehicle size classes have also been as equally 
  3disruptive to motor vehicle capacity utilization since 2000 as they were in the 1970s and 
early 1980s.  
 
The paper proceeds as follows.  Section II reviews the data available on various 
measures of oil prices and discusses how modern DSGE models accommodate the role of 
oil in the economy.  It also presents evidence that the presence of energy price controls 
and gasoline shortages in the 1970s may cause problems in empirical work because 
published prices in that era do not reflect the true cost of energy.  Using measures that 
include the cost of shortages, we find no evidence of weaker effects of oil shocks on the 
real economy.  Because we find that the motor vehicle industry plays a central role in the 
propagation of the oil shocks, the remainder of the paper studies this industry in detail.  
Section III examines the role of the motor vehicle industry in the overall economy.   
Section IV discusses how gas prices affect vehicle demand and Section V shows the ways 
in which these shocks affect production. Section VI concludes.      
I.  Oil shocks and the U.S. economy 
We begin by reviewing the behavior of several key measures of oil prices over the 
past few decades.  After describing how macro DSGE models have been used to 
understand the role of energy costs in the economy, we present evidence that price 
controls may have led to a wedge between the published price of oil and the true cost of 
oil during the large oil price shocks in the 1970s.  Using vector autoregressions that are 
similar to those estimated by Blanchard and Galí (2010) and Edelstein and Kilian (2009), 
we then show how mismeasurement of the true cost of oil in the 1970s may have caused 
the appearance of structural instability in the impulse response functions of real output to 
  4oil price shocks.  Using cost measures that account for shortages, we find that the impulse 
response functions have not changed much over time. 
A. Overview of oil prices 
  Figure 1 displays three oil price measures: the producer price index for crude 
petroleum (PPI-oil), the refiner acquisition cost of imported oil (RAQ), and the consumer 
price index for gasoline (CPI-gas).  Hamilton (2003, 2009b) typically uses the PPI-oil 
measure and Mork (1989) and Barsky and Kilian (2002) use versions of the RAQ 
measure.
2   Unfortunately, the RAQ measure starts only in 1974.
3  We include the CPI-
gas measure because several authors have shown that gasoline is a large share of U.S. 
petroleum consumption, and gasoline prices are also the most relevant energy price 
measure for the automobile sector.
4   
Oil and gas prices—displayed in log current dollars in the upper panel of Figure 1 
(thick solid line) and in log real index points in the lower panel—have risen notably at 
several points in history.  Four episodes stand out in particular: First, the real price of 
gasoline rose 27 percent between October 1973 and May 1974, the result of an even 
larger rise in the price of crude oil after the Yom Kippur War.  After falling back a bit 
over the next four years, the price of crude oil began to rise again at the end of 1978.  By 
the spring of 1980, the Iranian Revolution and the Iran-Iraq war led to losses in crude oil 
                                                 
2 Blanchard and Galí (2008) use the price of West Texas intermediate oil, available from FRED.  This 
series shares the same problems with the PPI measure that we will discuss below. 
3 Barksy and Kilian (2002) extend it back to 1971, but we are worried about this extension, for 
reasons given below. 
4 Also, Kilian (2009) highlights the importance of studying gas prices separately from crude oil prices. 
  5production that pushed up the price of imported oil 71 percent and the price of gasoline 
46 percent.  Between 1982 and 1985, the nominal price of gasoline grew only modestly 
until Saudi Arabia abandoned production quotas and the price of crude oil plunged.    
Real gasoline prices continued to trend lower after 1985, and, by the end of the 
1990s, real gasoline prices had receded to record low levels.  This pattern changed 
abruptly at the beginning of 1999, when OPEC member countries phased in several cuts 
to production quotas.  The real price of gasoline surged 43 percent by the summer of 
2001 before the weakening world economy put downward pressure on crude oil prices.  
The relief was short lived, however.  Gas prices began to rise again in early 2002, when 
political turmoil in Venezuela shut down much of the country’s crude oil production; real 
crude prices climbed 588 percent and gasoline prices climbed 127 percent by summer 
2008, and then collapsed when the financial crisis spread from the housing sector to the 
rest of the economy and interrupted aggregate demand. 
B. Oil shocks in macro DSGE models 
Economists take a keen interest in oil prices because these episodes of steep 
increases in prices were often followed by recessions.  The literature has introduced into 
macro models four principle channels through which oil or energy shocks can lead to 
recessions: (i) Energy serves as an important input to production; (ii) energy is an 
important consumption good; (iii) changes in energy prices lead to costly shifts in 
demand across sectors; and (iv) the policy response to oil price shocks includes monetary 
tightening, a move that depresses output.  Often layered on top of these channels are 
forces that multiply and propagate the effects of oil price shocks on aggregate output, 
such as real wage rigidities (e.g. Bruno and Sachs (1982), Blanchard and Galí (2010), 
  6Blanchard and Riggi (2009)), imperfect competition (Rotemberg and Woodford (1996)), 
variable utilization rates (Finn (2000)), vintage capital effects (Atkeson and Kehoe 
(1999), Wei (2009)), and multiplier effects created by externalities across firms (Aguiar-
Conraria and Wen (2007)).  We will briefly discuss each of these channels and point out 
which parameters in these DSGE models are suspected to have changed over time. 
 
Energy as an input to production 
Berndt and Wood (1975), Bruno and Sachs (1982), and Pindyck and Rotemberg 
(1983) were among the first to study energy price shocks in a framework that 
accommodated energy as an input to production.  The strength of this channel is limited, 
however, by the small share of energy in total production costs, even in the 1970s.  Finn 
(1991, 2000) modifies the standard model to reflect the notion that the energy 
requirements of installed capital are often fixed, and thus energy must be used in fixed 
proportions to capital utilization.  This feature makes output more sensitive to increases 
in energy prices.  
In many of the models mentioned above, a decrease in the amount of oil required 
to produce a unit of output would reduce the effect of oil shocks on the aggregate 
economy.  This result suggests that increases over time in the fuel efficiency of many 
types of production technology may have weakened the relationship between of oil price 
and real output.  In addition, structural parameters not directly related to the use of energy 
can also affect the transmission of energy price shocks in DSGE models.  For example, 
Blanchard and Galí (2010) show that a decline in the rigidity of wages in these types of 
models reduces the effects of oil price shocks on output.   
  7 
Energy as consumption good 
In addition to the consequences of reduced output in general equilibrium, 
increases in oil prices also have direct effects on demand.  First, oil shocks can lead to 
declines in demand for goods for which consumption is complementary with purchases of 
oil.  Hamilton (1988) and Wei (2009) use models of demand for motor vehicles to show 
this effect.  Second, oil shocks introduce uncertainty into the outlook for future energy 
prices, and increases in uncertainty can dampen demand for goods if purchases are costly 
to reverse (Bernanke (1983)).  Third, for energy consuming capital goods, increases in 
the price of energy change the desired characteristics of the capital in use.  Because the 
energy efficiency of the existing stock of consumer durables available in the short run is 
largely fixed, demand for new goods can shift between products in an exaggerated 
fashion and reflects the widening differential in the relative cost of ownership between 
different types of goods.  For motor vehicles, smaller and more fuel-efficient models 
naturally become more desirable. 
In these types of models, one parameter that has likely changed over time is the 
energy efficiency of consumer durable goods, including motor vehicles and other 
appliances.  When energy efficiency rises or the share of these types of goods in total 
consumption falls, then we would expect the impact of oil shocks on output to diminish 
over time. 
 
Sectoral shifts and costly factor mobility 
  8Several papers have investigated sectoral shifts as a way in which oil price shocks 
affect the aggregate output.  Davis (1987) and Hamilton (1988) both suggest that oil price 
shocks have a bigger effect on output if the shocks induce sectoral shifts and factor 
adjustment is costly.  Bresnahan and Ramey (1993) argue that oil shocks can lead to 
disruptive sectoral shifts even within narrowly defined industries.  They present empirical 
evidence that shifts in demand between size classes of automobiles disrupted output in 
the U.S. automobile industry during the 1970s. 
In the context of the multi-sector models, it is not clear that the structure of the 
economy has changed in a way that would weaken the transmission of oil price shocks 
through the sectoral shifts channel.  We find evidence in the motor vehicle industry that 
this channel remains quite potent. 
 
Monetary Policy Reaction Functions 
  Bernanke, Gertler and Watson (1997) argue that the endogenous response of 
monetary policy to an increase in oil prices is an important part of the outsized declines 
observed in output, a result they showed by using a structural vector autoregression and  
counterfactual experiments with different monetary policy rules.
5  Using a calibrated 
DGE model, Leduc and Sill (2004) found that 40 percent of the decline in output that 
follows a positive shock to oil prices reflects the systematic component of monetary 
policy. 
                                                 
5 Hamilton and Herrera (2004) questioned details of their specification.  Bernanke, Gertler and 
Watson (2004) responded and re-estimating their model in a way that attempts to deal with this critique and 
find results only slightly less strong than in their original paper.   
  9  To look for changes in policy parameters over time and assess whether these 
changes may have reduced the impact of oil shocks on output, a number of papers have 
either simulated monetary DGE models or estimated monetary structural vector auto 
regressions.  Herrera and Pesavento (2009), Blanchard and Galí (2010), and Blanchard 
and Riggi (2009) all find evidence that oil price shocks have had less impact in recent 
decades, in part, because of the changes in monetary policy.  
  To summarize, the theoretical literature has suggested a variety of ways in which 
oil shocks affect the economy.  Some of these effects should be expected to be weaker 
now, while other effects can easily be as strong. 
C. The importance of non-price rationing in the 1970s 
In the models described above, it is assumed that the price of oil reflects the true 
acquisition cost of energy for firms and households.  While the literature on the effects of 
oil shocks has debated the merits of various measures of oil prices and whether the 
effects are nonlinear,
6 much of it has missed a potentially important change in the degree 
to which oil prices reflect oil disruptions.  In particular, other than Mork (1989), 
macroeconomists have not paid much attention to the embargoes, price controls, and 
shortages that marked the oil price disturbances in the 1970s.  Helbling and Turley (1975) 
document that price controls were first imposed on the U.S. domestic oil industry in 
August 1971 as part of the general imposition of price controls.  The controls on other 
sectors of the economy were phased out, but the controls were made more stringent on 
the domestic oil industry in response to the OPEC embargo of October 1973.  These 
                                                 
6 For example, see the debate between Kilian and Vigfusson (2009) and Hamilton (2009b). 
  10complex controls, which imposed a price ceiling on “old” oil that was lower than the one 
imposed on “new” oil, led to significant disruptions in the production of domestic oil and 
held the average domestic price of crude oil below the world price.  Most of the effects of 
these controls were felt in the markets for gasoline and diesel fuel.  According to some 
estimates, 20 percent of the gasoline stations ran out of gas during the height of the crisis 
(Frum (2000)). 
Pisarski and de Terra (1975) detail the policy responses to the embargo in various 
European countries.  While most European countries did not impose the types of price 
controls imposed in the United States, they responded with other sorts of controls, such as 
bans on Sunday driving (Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Switzerland) and limits on gas 
purchases (Great Britain, Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland). Almost all countries 
imposed lower speed limits. 
Multiple oil and gas price controls also helped produce shortages after the Iranian 
Revolution of 1979.   In April 1979, President Carter announced gradual decontrol of oil 
prices, but proposed a windfall profits tax.  In January 1981, President Reagan signed an 
order leading to the complete deregulation of oil and gas prices.   
To quantify the additional cost imposed on consumers by non-price rationing in 
the 1970s, Frech and Lee (1987) use data on urban and rural traffic patterns in California 
and estimates of the price elasticity of demand for gasoline from Lee (1980).  They 
estimate that the time cost of the queues added between 13 to 84 percent to the price of a 
gallon of gasoline between December 1973 and March 1974; the additional time cost 
implicitly paid by consumers between May 1979 and July 1979 varied from 6 to 33 
percent.  Thus, the price index for gasoline shown in Figure 1 potentially understates the 
  11true cost of gasoline quite severely in periods affected by the two oils shocks of the 
1970s. 
The producer price index for crude petroleum suffers from the same problem 
because of the price controls on domestic crude oil.  The refiners’ acquisition cost of 
imported oil used by Barsky and Kilian (2002) comes closer to measuring the world price 
of oil.  However, this measure still does not capture all of the additional costs imposed on 
the U.S. economy by distortions caused by price controls and the entitlement system.  
The reason is that price controls cause inefficiencies and deadweight loss that are larger 
than the gap between actual prices and market clearing prices.
7
In order to capture the true cost of gasoline during these episodes, we propose two 
new variables: The first variable augments published gas prices with estimates of the 
additional time cost during the periods of gasoline lines.  In particular, we use the average 
of the rural and urban estimates from Table 1 in Frech and Lee (1987), which compares 
the time costs per gallon to the published price per gallon of gasoline for the months of 
December 1973 through March 1974 and May 1979 through July 1979.  All told, 
rationing is estimated to have added between 8 percent (in July 1979) to 67 percent (in 
March 1974) to the shadow price of a gallon of gasoline.
8  Using these estimates, we 
                                                 
 
7 For example, Frech and Lee describe inefficiencies in the allocation of gasoline across urban and 
rural markets.  Similarly, Davis and Killian (2009) show that the total inefficiency costs of price controls on 
residential natural gas in the U.S. was three times larger than was the estimate of the simple deadweight 
loss. 
8 Frech and Lee’s estimates are based on data from only California, so the question arises as to how 
California’s shortages compared to the rest of the nation.  According to the Feb. 8, 1974 Wall Street 
Journal, there was no rationing in “New England north of Boston, much of the Midwest, Denver, Nevada, 
and Southern California.  In Northern California, the word was okay on weekdays and in daylight, but 
  12construct a shortage adjusted index for the real price of gasoline, which is shown as the 
dashed line in figure 2. 
Because the rationing-by-queue cost estimates likely capture the effect of 
shortages imperfectly, we also consider a second measure—the special question posed by 
Thomson Reuters/University of Michigan in the Survey of Consumer Attitudes.   
Respondents to the monthly survey are asked several questions related to car buying 
conditions.  The survey tracks the portion of respondents who cite the price of gasoline or 
possible fuel shortages as a reason that car buying conditions are poor.
9   This measure is 
shown in Figure 3.  The portion of consumers that expressed anxiety over fuel prices 
ramped up sharply at the time of the oil price shocks in the 1970s and early 1980s.  
Although the rise in real gas prices was much greater in the 2000s than in the 1970s and 
early 1980s, the consumer sentiment variable hit similar peaks in both periods.  A 
CNN/Opinion Research Poll conducted in June 2008 found that consumers were more 
concerned about long gas lines than about high prices (CNNMoney.com, June 10, 2008).  
This may explain why the run-up in gas prices in the 2000s, though bigger than the run-
ups in earlier episodes, did not cause a larger effect on consumer sentiment.  
                                                                                                                                                 
otherwise watch out.  There were long lines in Washington, D.C., and the Philadelphia area…and in New 
York and New Jersey, where things have been tough for quite a while now.” 
9 Other reasons consumers can give for this being a bad time for buying a car are: (1) prices of cars 
are too high; (2) interest rates are too high; (3) can’t afford to buy; (4) uncertain future; and (5) poor 
selection or quality of cars. 
  13D. The responses of output, consumption, and prices to oil price shocks 
Using the published measures of energy prices and the two variables that account 
for non-price rationing in the 1970s, we now revisit the evidence used to suggest that 
aggregate activity has been responding less to energy price shocks in recent years than it 
used to in the past.  The energy price measures we consider are the following: (1) The 
consumer price index for gasoline; (2) Hamilton’s (2003,2009b) “net oil price 
increases”
10; (3) the CPI index for gasoline that has been augmented with the time cost of 
rationing-by-queue; and (4) the measure of consumer attitudes toward gasoline prices and 
fuel shortages.  Our strategy is as follows:  First we show that the impulse response 
functions from vector autoregressions estimated by Blanchard and Galí (2010) and 
Edelstein and Kilian (2009) do not change much if published gasoline prices are used in 
place of the authors’ original oil price measures.  Second, we show that the impulse 
response functions based on gasoline price measures that account for the effects of 
shortages present a different story. 
We begin by estimating a vector autoregression (VAR) that is similar to the one 
used by Blanchard and Galí (2010).  The VAR system we estimate is given in 
equation (1).  
(1)  t t t U Y L A Y + = −1 ) ( 
In the VAR estimated by Blanchard and Galí with quarterly data,   includes the nominal 
price of oil, the CPI, the GDP deflator, nominal nonfarm compensation, real GDP and 
t Y
                                                 
10 The Hamilton measure is defined as the log change in the price index for gasoline relative to its 
previous three-year high if it is positive, or zero if it is negative 
  14nonfarm business hours.  In other specifications, they also included the federal funds rate.  
In our version of their analysis,    is built from monthly observations of the following 
variables (in order): (i) A selected version of one of the oil shock variables, (ii) the 
consumer price index (CPI), (iii) nominal wages of private production workers, (iv) 
industrial production, (v) civilian hours, and (vi) the federal funds rate.  A(L) is a matrix 
of polynomials in the lag operator L.  U is a vector of disturbances.  All variables except 
the sentiment measure and the federal funds rate are in logs.  The shock to oil prices is 
identified using a standard Cholesky decomposition.  We include a linear time trend and 
six lags of the variables.  The data are monthly and span 1967:1 to 2009:12. 
t Y
Blanchard and Galí (2010) compare samples that are split between 1983 and 
1984, which is the typical split for studies of the Great Moderation.  Edelstein and Kilian 
(2009) study samples split between 1987 and 1988.   We choose a split between 1985 and 
1986, as this date is between the dates used by these authors, and it also coincides with 
the rather dramatic change in the nature of the oil market that occurred in 1986.     
We summarize the results in table 1.  As an alternative to showing dozens of 
impulse response functions from various permutations of oil price measures and 
estimation periods, table 1 shows the peak response of key macro variables to a shock in 
each oil price indicator in each period.   
The oil measure used for each impulse is shown in the first line of each panel in 
the table. The shock has been normalized so that the size of the increase at its peak is 
equal to one in both periods.  It is important to note, however, that the standard deviations 
of the (non-normalized) shocks to nominal gas prices and to Hamilton’s net price gain 
measure are more than twice as high in the second period as in the first period.  In 
  15contrast, the standard deviation of the shocks to the shortage-adjusted gas price is roughly 
constant across the periods, whereas the standard deviation of the shocks to the measure 
of consumer sentiment toward gasoline is about 50 percent higher in the second period.
 
The key comparison in Table 1 is the ratio in the last column.  For a given shock 
in the gas cost variable, it shows the ratio of the peak response of the other variables in 
the second period to the peak response in the first period.  The results for both the 
standard nominal gas price measure and Hamilton’s nonlinear measure show that the 
responses of both industrial production and hours are less than half as large in the second 
period as in the first period.  The response of inflation appears to have declined by an 
even larger proportion than did the real variables.  In contrast, when either the real index 
of gas prices adjusted for the cost of shortages or the measure of consumer sentiment 
about gas prices/shortages are used as the oil price indicator, the peak response of 
industrial production becomes greater in the second period than in the first period.  For 
hours, the response remains slightly less in the second period than in the first period if we 
use as the oil price indicator the shortage adjusted gas price index, but it becomes greater 
if we use the measure of consumer sentiment.
11  However, the response of inflation is 
still lower in the second period than in the first period even if the shortage adjusted gas 
price index or the gasoline sentiment measure is used as the oil price indicator.
12   
                                                 
11 We do not show the response of nominal wages and the funds rate because their responses are not 
significantly different from zero and the dynamic patterns swing from positive to negative in some cases. 
12 The results are similar if we substitute the chained price deflator for personal consumption 
expenditures for the consumer price index.  
  16To examine more formally the relationship between consumer sentiment toward 
gasoline and the various gasoline price measures, we estimate a number of bivariate 
vector auto regressions and compare the relationship in the early and late periods.  We 
find that shocks to the published CPI for gasoline appear to have an effect on sentiment in 
the early period that is about twice as large as the effect in the late period.  In contrast, 
shocks to the shortage adjusted gasoline price index have about the same peak effect on 
sentiment in each period.  This evidence suggests that the presence of shortages in the 
early period is the key difference between shocks to gasoline sentiment and shocks to the 
published CPI for gasoline. 
Edelstein and Kilian (2009) find that much of the decline in aggregate activity (or 
aggregate consumption, more specifically) that follows a jump in oil prices comes 
through demand for motor vehicles.  They also show that this channel has weakened over 
time, thereby reducing the effect of oil shocks on aggregate activity.  Because this result 
is even more likely to have been affected by presence of market distortions in the 1970s, 
we also re-estimate a VAR similar to the Edelstein and Kilian (2009) model, using our 
shortage adjusted measures for the true cost of gasoline.  
We estimate a trivariate VAR, in which   is defined by (i) one of the oil cost 
indicators, (ii) the log of real total consumption excluding motor vehicles, and (iii) the log 
of real consumption of motor vehicles.  In the first set of results, we use as an energy 
price indicator the Edelstein and Kilian (2009) measure of the purchasing power lost to 
increases in oil prices: This measure scales the changes in real energy prices by the share 
t Y
  17of energy in consumption expenditures.
13  In the second set of results, we use as an oil 
cost indicator the consumer sentiment toward gasoline.  In each set of results we estimate 
the VAR in two sample periods: 1967:1 – 1985:12 and 1986:1 – 2009:12.  We normalize 
each shock so that the peak responses of the shock variable are equal to one in each 
sample period. 
Figure 4 shows the estimates, with filled dots indicating when the estimated 
response is more than two standard deviations from zero and open circles indicating 
when the response is more than one but less than two standard deviations from zero.  The 
panels to the left show responses that use the Edelstein and Kilian purchasing power 
series as an oil cost indicator, and the responses to the shocks are largely consistent with 
those originally reported by Edelstein and Kilian.  Specifically, the response of total 
consumption falls less sharply in the second sample period than in the first sample period, 
though the responses are not statistically significant in either period.  To the degree that 
the response has changed, the bottom panel shows that most of the change comes from 
the consumption of motor vehicles: The response in the consumption of motor vehicles is 
much less in the second period (the dashed line) than the first period (the solid line).  
The column to the right in figure 4 shows the impulse responses obtained when 
the consumer sentiment toward gasoline serves as the oil cost indicator.  Several 
comparisons here stand out.   First, the responses of consumption to these shocks have 
not diminished between the early and late periods; this holds true for the consumption of 
                                                 
13 We also considered a measure that scaled prices by the average fuel efficiency of the motor vehicle 
stock and the miles driven by households.  The results were similar to those using the Edelstein and Kilian 
measure. 
  18motor vehicles and the consumption of all other goods and services.  Moreover, the 
responses in the second period appear to be more persistent than those in the first period.  
Second, the responses based on these shocks are statistically significant, an indication 
that real activity is more closely related to consumer perceptions of the price of gasoline 
and its availability than it is to published fuel prices. And third, the decline in 
consumption of motor vehicles after a gasoline price sentiment shock is many times 
larger than the response of consumption excluding motor vehicles.
14      
For comparison, we also estimated the impulse response based on other measures 
of energy prices.  Using the Hamilton measure of net oil price increases, the responses 
show a significant muting between the early and the late samples.  If we use the shortage 
adjusted measure of gasoline prices, we find results qualitatively similar to those obtained 
using consumer sentiment toward gasoline as the oil cost indicator.  The responses to oil 
shocks are only slightly smaller in the second period than in the first periods; the peak 
impact on total consumption is 0.9 in the second period relative to the first, and on motor 
vehicle consumption is 0.8.  
To summarize, when oil price shocks are measured as the shocks to either the 
published price index for gasoline, the Hamilton net increase in oil prices, or the 
Edelstein and Kilian purchasing power measure, we confirm the results from the 
literature that oil shocks have much less of an impact on the economy after 1985 than 
they did up until 1985.  In contrast, when we measure oil shocks as either the shocks to 
                                                 
14 The relative magnitudes of the estimated responses imply that about 30 percent of the decline in 
total consumption that occurs 15 months after a gasoline price shock comes from the decline in motor 
vehicle consumption.   
  19the price of gasoline adjusted for the cost of shortages or as the shocks to consumer 
sentiment toward gasoline, we find that the impact of these shocks on real activity has 
either diminished only slightly or has become larger in the later period.  Lastly, all 
measures of energy price shocks produce results that suggest the motor vehicle industry 
is a key part of the transmission mechanism between oil shocks and real activity.  Thus, 
the remainder of the paper presents evidence that, although the motor vehicle industry has 
changed in many ways over the past 40 years, this sector continues to act as an important 
propagation mechanism between oil price shocks and real activity. 
II.  The contribution of the motor vehicle sector to the U.S. Economy 
The contraction in the size of the Detroit three automakers in recent decades often 
leaves the impression that the contribution of the auto industry to the U.S. economy has 
declined significantly.  In this section we present some measures of the contribution of 
the entire domestic motor vehicle industry (the portion operated by the Detroit firms as 
well as the portion operated by other firms) to the U.S. economy and to the business 
cycle.   
Figure 5 shows two measures of the contribution of motor vehicle output to U.S. 
GDP: Panel A shows the quarterly values of a statistic commonly referred to as “gross 
motor vehicle output,” and panel B shows annual estimates of the domestic value added 
of motor vehicle and parts manufacturing, a narrower view of the industry’s contribution 
to GDP.
15  The lower line in each of these graphs displays each measure of output as a 
                                                 
 
15 “Gross motor vehicle output” in the NIPAs is the retail value of motor vehicles sold to final 
consumers (households, businesses, and governments) and the wholesale value of vehicles invested in 
  20share of total GDP, and the upper lines plot these measures as a share of either goods 
GDP (for gross motor vehicle output) or total value added from goods manufacturing (for 
motor vehicle and parts manufacturing value added).  Shares are calculated from nominal 
expenditures data reported in the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPAs).  The 
dashed lines in the figure represent the 95 percent confidence interval for the sample 
mean of each line in two sample periods: 1967 to 1985, and 1986 to 2007 (before the 
financial crisis had affected vehicle sales).   
Two features of the graphs in figure 5 are worth noting:  First, motor vehicle 
output drops abruptly in recessions, and many of these recessions followed large 
increases in gasoline prices.  As shown in table 2, the motor vehicle sector alone accounts 
for between 14 and 22 percent of the variance of the quarterly changes in real GDP, 
depending on the time period.  Even after the great moderation, these figures continue to 
exceed the moderate size of the motor vehicle sector.   
The second feature of the graph that is worth noting is that the size of the motor 
vehicle industry as a share of the U.S. economy does not show a downward trend that is 
as striking as one might expect.  As a share of total GDP (the top line in Panel A), motor 
vehicles represented about 4 percent of the U.S. economy between 1967 and 1985, and 
that figure declined to 3½ percent between 1986 and 2007.  As a share of the goods 
producing sectors of the U.S. economy, however, motor vehicle output actually increased 
                                                                                                                                                 
inventories.  This series is adjusted for net exports of motor vehicles and has the advantage of capturing all 
of the value added from the production process as well as from the distribution of motor vehicles to final 
demand, including the wholesale and retail margins. This measure is not the same as “gross output of motor 
vehicles and parts” in the U.S. industry accounts, which is the sum of all sales and receipts in the industry, 
including sales of intermediate inputs to firms in other (or in the same) industries.  
  21between the two periods, from about 10½ percent in the early sample, to about 
11½  percent in the more recent sample.  Manufacturing value added gives a similar 
picture:  Motor vehicle and parts manufacturers accounted for 5.7  percent of U.S. 
manufacturing value added in the 1970s and early 1980s, and this share slipped to 
5.2  percent in the more recent period.  However, as shown by the dashed lines, the 
decline between the two periods is not very pronounced relative to its high volatility.
16
All told, the motor vehicle sector has been a modest but relatively stable share of 
the goods producing sector over the past 40 years, and the declines that have occurred in 
its contribution to total GDP mostly reflect an increase in the size of the services sector.  
Most importantly, the auto industry continues to induce swings in aggregate activity that 
far exceed its modest size.   
III. Oil shocks and the demand for motor vehicles 
We now describe theories of how gasoline prices affect vehicle demand and then 
present evidence in some detailed auto industry data that consumers adjust their vehicle 
buying patterns in response to changes in gasoline prices.  In addition, we show that this 
behavior has not changed much over the past 40 years. 
A rather large literature has developed—much of it in the late 1970s—to analyze 
how households respond to changes in gasoline prices by making adjustments to their 
                                                 
16 One additional measure of motor vehicle output that we examined (but do not report) is motor 
vehicle and parts output.  This wider view of the industry is intended to help control for the value of 
imported intermediate inputs to motor vehicle production that have risen over time.  (See Kurz, and 
Lengermann (2008), and Klier and Rubenstein (2009).)  Using this adjusted measure, motor vehicle output 
was 12½ percent of goods GDP in both the early and late periods, and it declined from 4¾ percent of total 
GDP in the early period, to 3¾ percent in the later period.     
  22vehicle stock and to their driving behavior (e.g. Dahl (1979)).
17  More recently, Wei 
(2009) casts the vehicle purchasing decision in a general equilibrium framework, in 
which households invest in transportation capital with a particular level of fuel efficiency 
and then combine it with gasoline to produce the good that ultimately enters their utility 
functions—personal vehicle travel.  Because consumers are forward looking, changes in 
gasoline prices lead to dynamic effects on the vehicle stock and average fuel efficiency. 
Following a gasoline price shock, households respond in the short run mostly by 
reducing travel, though estimates from the literature suggest the response in the short run 
is quite low (e.g. Hughes, Knittel and Sperling (2006)).  Over long horizons, households 
adjust their vehicle technology and reduce further their consumption of gasoline.  Using 
her DSGE model calibrated to US fuel and vehicle consumption data, Wei (2009) finds 
that vehicle purchases and total miles traveled decline after a permanent shock to 
gasoline prices, though the equilibrium fuel efficiency of new vehicles increases.  
These theories suggest that permanent increases in gasoline prices lead 
households to reduce vehicle travel in the short run and then to replace their vehicle stock 
in the long run.  In the very-long run, gasoline prices can also impact where households 
choose to live and work. 
To see the effects of these decisions on vehicle travel over the past 40 years, 
figure 6 plots total vehicle miles traveled per household in the United States between 
1970 and 2009.  Two features in the figure are noteworthy:  First, households nowadays 
consume a significantly larger amount of travel than they did in the early 1970s:  The 
                                                 
17 The CBO study from January 2008, “Effect of Gasoline Prices on Driving Behavior and Vehicle 
Markets,” surveys much of the literature from the 1970s. 
  23average household drove approximately 1,500 miles per month in 1970, and that figure 
has increased 50  percent, to almost 2,200 miles per month in the period 2000-2007.   
Second, households do cut back on travel when gasoline prices increase, though part of 
the decline in travel likely also reflects the deterioration in the broader economy that also 
occurs at these times.  
While households now drive more each month than they did in the early 1970s, 
they do so in vehicles that are, on average, more fuel efficient.   Figure 7 shows data from 
the U.S. Department of Transportation on the average fuel efficiency of the registered 
stocks of cars and light trucks (which include SUVs and vans).  As seen in the plot, the 
average fuel economy for each type of vehicle has increased over the sample, though 
much of the gains occurred in the 1980s, after the United States introduced Corporate 
Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards that were met by reducing the average weight 
of cars and introducing some technological improvements to engine design.   
One feature of figure 7 that receives lots of attention is the marked slowdown (or 
near halt) in the rate of improvement for average fuel economy that occurred in the 
1990s.  This was an era of relatively cheap gasoline, and, likely as a result, demand 
shifted away from cars and toward larger sports utility vehicles.
18  Studies that more 
carefully take into account vehicle size and engine horsepower, such as Knittel (2009), 
conclude that the technological frontier of fuel-economy/vehicle-weight/engine-power 
possibilities continued to expand over this period, but these improvements are obscured 
in aggregate data by the shift in sales across vehicle size classes. 
                                                 
18 The average fuel efficiency of vehicles flowing into the stock each year (i.e., new sales) actually 
decreased during the 1990s, as the mix in sales shifted toward light trucks. 
  24Shifts in vehicle demand across vehicle size classes often occur when gasoline 
prices move dramatically, a stylized fact that was discussed by Bresnahan and Ramey 
(1993).  To see evidence of this, figure 8 shows the domestic market shares of vehicles of 
various sizes.
19  The panel to the left shows the key market shares in the 1970s and early 
1980s.  The domestic market share for standard-size cars fell noticeably in 1973 and did 
not stabilize until almost two years later.
20  When the second oil price shocks hit in 1979, 
this market share fell even further.  The market share of small cars moved in the opposite 
direction on both occasions.   
The panel to the right shows market shares of key vehicle segments in the 2000s.  
The patterns in market shares since 2000 have been similar to those observed in the 
earlier episodes of sharp gas prices increases, though the scope of the variety of products 
available has grown considerably since the 1970s.  The market share of full size pickups, 
utility vehicles and vans fell more than 15 percentage points between its peak in 2004 and 
early 2009.  Small cars and the new cross utility vehicle segment picked up most of this 
market share.
21
                                                 
19 This graph focuses on the market for domestically produced goods.  An additional effect not shown 
in the graph is the shift to imported cars when oil prices increase; this move occurred in both the in 1980s 
and in the 2000s.  The share of imported vehicles rose from about 15 percent in the mid 1970s to about 
25 percent in the first half of the 1980s.  The import share then fell back as foreign automakers began to 
establish manufacturing operations in North America, and the import share fell below 10 percent by 1996,  
The market share of imported vehicles turned up again in the late 1990s, and the share moved up from 
17 percent in 2000, to 26 percent in 2009. 
20 The domestic market share excludes vehicles imported from outside North America.   
21 A cross-utility vehicle is a utility vehicle that is assembled on a car chassis.  They are classified by 
the industry as a light truck.   
  25IV. The response of motor vehicle production 
Shocks that affect motor vehicle sales often lead to changes in the rate of 
production that are quite abrupt, and the high level of volatility in motor vehicle 
production has been studied extensively in the literature on inventories and production 
scheduling.  It is well-understood how changes in aggregate vehicle demand can lead to 
reductions in production.  In this section, we show how changes in the composition of 
demand, such as those induced by gas price increases, can lead to further declines in 
output. 
We begin by presenting an inventory model in which segment shifts lead to 
capacity mismatches and thereby reduce output.  We then study this channel using 
detailed auto industry data by vehicle size class.  We find that segment shifts are an 
important channel through which oil shocks affect the U.S. motor vehicle industry and 
that the importance of this channel has not declined much over time. 
A. Segment shifts and the constraints on capacity 
Bresnahan and Ramey (1993) speculated that a shift in demand from one vehicle 
segment to another, with no decline in overall demand, can lead to a decrease in 
production and capacity utilization.  They also argued that the variance of days’ supply 
(i.e. the inventory-sales ratio) across segments reflects mismatches between capacity and 
demand for vehicles in some segments. 
In order to formalize this hypothesis, we consider a simple model of a profit-
maximizing monopolist that sells cars to two segments of demand.  For each segment i, 
the monopolist chooses the price, Pt, and schedules production using regular time hours, 
RHt, and overtime hours, OHt.  These choices determine expected sales, St, and expected 
  26end-of period inventories, It.  The firm maximizes the expected present discounted value 
of profits, given as equation (2). 
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Inventory stocks evolve according to equation (4), 
(4) 2 , 1 , 1 = − + + = − i S OH RH I I it it it it it  
and the use of regular time hours is limited by the capacity constraints in equation (5). 
(5)    2 , 1 , = ≤ i K RHit
The parameters of the model satisfy the following restrictions:  0 < β < 1; γ > 0; ω > 1; αi, 
φi > 0; K > 0.   
Relative to the familiar linear-quadratic production smoothing model, the 
inventory holding costs in equation (3) are the same, but the marginal costs of production 
are somewhat more complicated:  Marginal costs in this model are flat when the 
monopolist uses regular time hours but rise when the firm must increase its workweek of 
capital and use overtime hours or a second shift.  This assumption induces a key 
asymmetry in marginal costs. 
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  27There are two types of demand shifts in these sales equations: The first, 
seg
t u , is a variable 
that shifts demand away from one segment and toward the other, while the second,  , 
is a variable that shifts the demand curves for all types of vehicles in the same direction.  
We assume that each of these shift variables follows an AR(1) process as shown in 
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The autocorrelation parameter ρ lies between 0 and 1, and the shocks ε and η are white 
noise. 




t u .  
To study the effects of the second type of shock—the shift in sales between segments—
we simulate the model and evaluate the optimal paths of key choice variables.  To 
calibrate the simulation, β and φi are set to match the averages observed in the data for 
interest rates and days’ supply for light vehicles.  We choose values for K, θA, θB, and γ to 
generate a price elasticity of demand of -1.5 at the steady-state level of output, a figure 
that is in the range of empirical estimates for total vehicle demand.   Finally, we set α
B
                                                
22
i 
and ω so that the premium on overtime hours or second shift hours is ten percent.    The 
23
 
22 Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995) find much higher elasticities (in absolute value) for particular 
models.  
23 The statutory overtime premium is 50 percent, whereas shift premia are typically 5 to 10 percent.  
Trejo (1991) has found that the implicit overtime premium is substantially lower than 50 percent.  Thus, 
our assumption of a 10 percent premium is within the relevant range. 
  28simulation considers shocks that shift the intercept of the demand curve by 10 percent, 
with ρ equal to 0.75.    
24
Because plants face the same cost function in each segment, the effects of an 
aggregate shock on inventories and production are the same in each segment.  And, 
because the inventory-sales ratios change by equal amounts in each segment, the cross-
section variance of the days’ supply remains zero.  This is not the case for shocks that 
shift demand between segments, a scenario that is shown in figure 9.  If demand for 
segment 1 cars shifts up and demand for segment 2 cars shifts down by an equal amount, 
total production falls because the rise in output in segment 1 does not fully offset the fall 
in output in segment 2.  The asymmetric response of production reflects the increase in 
marginal costs that occurs at the capacity constraint.  Mirroring this pattern, the price of 
vehicles in segment 1 rises by an amount that is different from the decline in the price of 
vehicles in segment 2.  All told, segment shifts reduce total production, sales, and 
capacity utilization, and they drive up the variance of days’ supply across vehicle 
segments. 
Some of these results depend critically on the increase in marginal cost that 
occurs when production exceeds the level of capacity.
25  If costs were instead quadratic, 
as is assumed in the standard production smoothing model, then marginal costs would be 
linear, capacity utilization would have no effect on production costs, and segment shifts 
                                                 
24 The values of the parameters are as follows: β = 0.997, φi = 2.5 for i = 1, 2, K= 40, θA = 100, θB = 1, 
γ = 19.85, αi = 0.1, and ω = 1.1. 
25 Several authors in the capacity utilization literature define full capacity as the point beyond which 
marginal production costs begin to rise too rapidly. See Klein (1960) and Corrado and Mattey (1996). 
  29would not reduce total production.
26  The variance of days’ supply would still increase in 
the case of quadratic costs, but the asymmetric response of production to positive and 
negative demand shocks requires the marginal cost function to exhibit some curvature.     
B. Evidence of capacity constraints and segment shifts in the auto industry 
To see the effects of segment shifts in the detailed auto industry data, figure 10 
plots day’s supply for vehicles in selected size classes in the early and late periods.  In the 
earlier period, days’ supply of standard cars grew to uncomfortably high levels at the 
time of both oil shocks, and days’ supply for small cars moved down.  Similarly, in the 
later period, days’ supply for full size trucks, vans and utilities climbed to critically high 
levels between 2000 and 2008, while days’ supply for small cars and cross utility 
vehicles moved down between 1998 and 2000 before edging back up in 2002.  As the 
shift in demand between segments accelerated again at the end of 2004, days’ supply for 
small vehicles receded, and several of the models in these segments were reported to be 
in short supply.
27  The onset of the financial crisis in the second half of 2008 appears to 
have been a common shock that pushed up days’ supply for almost all vehicle segments. 
                                                 
26 See, for example, equation (7) of Ramey and Vine (2006). 
27 The patterns in sales and days’ supply between 2000 and 2009 were influenced by occasional 
inventory clearance events, often targeted toward full size trucks and SUVs.   The Detroit manufacturers 
have typically dominated the full size truck market segments and therefore faced significant loss in market 
share as sales of these vehicles sagged over this period.  The large dip in days’ supply in late 2001 reflects 
the advent of zero-interest financing, and the plunge in stocks in 2005 coincides with the extension of these 
firms’ employee-discount programs to all customers. 
  30To measure these supply imbalances on a more general scale, we calculate the 
variance of days’ supply across size categories, 
DS V , that was described earlier. The 
formula is shown in equation (10).   
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t DS  denotes aggregate 
days’ supply, and i ranges from 1 to 11, covering five car segments (subcompact, 
compact, intermediate, full-size and luxury) and six truck segments (compact pickups, 
full-size pickups, small vans, large vans, cross utility vehicles, and full-size utility 
vehicles).  An increase the variance of days’ supply across segments indicates that the 
imbalance between the composition of capacity and the composition of demand has 
become worse.
28   
The variance of days’ supply is plotted in Figure 11 from January 1972 to March 
2009.  Large spikes in the variance correspond quite closely with the increases in fuel 
prices discussed earlier.  Also, the severity of some of the supply-demand imbalances that 
occurred after 2002 appear even greater than the magnitudes observed in the early 1980s. 
To investigate the empirical relationship between these spikes in the variance of days’ 
supply, the cost of gasoline, and movements in capacity utilization, we estimate a VAR in 
                                                 
28 In the theoretical model presented above, the variance of days’ supply in steady state was zero, 
because the parameters of the cost function were the same for each vehicle segment.  In actual industry 
data, vehicle types often show distinct long-run average inventory-sales ratios.  This implies that the cross-
sectional variance can be positive in steady state.      
  31which.   includes four variables: (i) consumer sentiment about gasoline prices or 
shortages; (ii) aggregate days-supply for domestic vehicles; (iii) the variance of days 
supply across segments (defined in equation (10)); and (iv) capacity utilization for light 
motor vehicle assembly.
t Y
29  The VAR also includes six lags and a linear time trend. 
Oil shocks in the VAR play two roles: First, oil shocks reduce aggregate demand 
and dampen sales for all types of vehicles.  In the production model described earlier, this 
role resembles the aggregate shock that drives up days’ supply for the entire industry and 
reduces capacity utilization for all segments.  Second, high gas prices lead to segment 
shifts in demand away from large vehicles and toward small vehicles.  This role leads to 
mismatches in capacity and drives up the variance of days’ supply across vehicle 
segments.  Our production model also shows how shocks in this role can reduce capacity 
utilization when capacity constraints push up marginal costs for the products in demand. 
  Figure 12 shows the responses of the variables in   to a shock to the measure of 
consumer sentiment toward gasoline (meaning a higher percentage of consumers were 
worried about high gas prices), which is ordered first in the VAR.  The VAR is estimated 
over the full sample from January 1972 to March 2009.  As seen in the figure, both the 
level and variance of days-supply increase after a sentiment shock, indicating that shocks 
to gasoline sentiment affect demand both as an aggregate shock and as segment shifting 
shock.  According to the last panel, capacity utilization also falls significantly. 
t Y
                                                 
29 The production theory presented above suggests that one should also include vehicle prices for each 
segment, but unfortunately we lack data on segment specific vehicle prices over much of the necessary 
history. 
  32Has the relationship between these variables changed over time?  To answer this 
question, we compare the impulse response functions from VARs estimated separately 
for the 1972—1985 and 1986—2009 periods and plot the results in figure 13.  The 
shocks to consumer sentiment toward gasoline have been normalized to reach a peak of 
1.0 in both periods.  As seen in the figure, the peak responses of both the level and 
variance of days’ supply are about 30 percent larger in the early period than in the later 
period. The response of capacity utilization, however, is about the same in both periods.   
  Finally, using the VAR estimates and a set of counter-factual experiments, we 
parse the response of capacity utilization to oil shocks into portions that reflect the 
aggregate demand channel and the segment shifts channel.  In one experiment, we plot 
the response of utilization to a gasoline sentiment shock after we have shut down the 
segment shifts channel by replacing the estimated coefficients of the days’ supply 
equation in the VAR with zeros.  The difference between the baseline response and this 
counter-factual response reveals the contribution of the aggregate demand channel to the 
transmission of gasoline shocks to capacity utilization.  In a second experiment, we shut 
down the segment shifts channel by setting the coefficients of the variance of days’ 
supply equation to zero.  The third experiment shuts down both channels.   
The panels in figure 14 show the results of the each experiment; the solid lines 
represent the baseline response of capacity utilization to a gasoline sentiment shock, and 
the dashed lines represent one of the counterfactual responses.  In the first panel, the 
counterfactual response is only half as large as the baseline response, a comparison that 
suggests the contraction in demand for all vehicles plays an important role in transmitting 
oil shocks to motor vehicle production.  The counterfactual response in the second panel 
  33is also only about half as large when the segment shifts channel is shutdown, indicating 
that this channel is also important.  The counterfactual response in the third panel remains 
very close to zero, suggesting that omitted channels are not too important. 
The counter-factual exercises indicate that the level and variance of days’ supply 
channels are about equally important in transmitting oil shocks to motor vehicle output.  
These results imply that oil shocks have both aggregate effects and segment shift effects.  
Moreover, the relationship between these variables appears to have been stable over time. 
V.  Conclusions 
This paper has studied the impact of oil shocks on the U.S. economy and its motor 
vehicle industry and has examined whether these relationships have changed over time.   
We have found that, once the costs of queuing are added to the prices paid for gasoline 
during the gasoline shortages in the 1970s, real output in the United States has been as 
sensitive to oil price shocks since the mid 1980s as it had been in the 1970s and early 
1980s.  The effect on inflation, however, has diminished over time. 
We have also found that the motor vehicle industry plays an important role in 
propagating oil price shocks to the rest of the U.S. economy and that, despite the many 
innovations in the ways motor vehicles are produced and consumed, the primary channels 
through which oil prices directly affect demand for motor vehicles have not weakened 
much over time.  Specifically, the abrupt shifts in demand across vehicle size classes that 
stem from oil shocks have been as disruptive to the supply-demand relationship in the 
motor vehicle industry since the mid 1980s as they were in the 1970s and early 1980s.   
Our results may impact the debate over which changes in the U.S. economy have 
led to the decline in GDP volatility since the mid 1980s, or the “Great Moderation.”  If 
  34the relationship between oil shocks and real output had, in fact, become weaker since the 
mid 1980s, then this stylized fact could have bolstered arguments that structural change 
had reduced the sensitivity of output to these types of shocks.  Our results, to the 
contrary, suggest that this particular relationship has been stable over time.  The 
diminished impact of oil shocks on inflation, however, may support the theory that 
monetary policy has played a role in reducing volatility.  Finally, our results point to 
another change in government policy that may also have reduced the volatility of output 
since the 1970s:  A decline in the propensity to use price controls. 
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Table 1 
 
The Peak Effects of Oil Shocks on U.S. Variables 
 
 
Estimation period:  Jan. 1967 to Dec. 1985    Jan. 1986 to Dec. 2009 
  Peak effect Month 
of peak Peak effect Month 
of peak 
Ratio
  (1) (2) (3) (4)  (3)/(1)
Nominal gas price  1.000 3  1.000 2   
     Industrial production  -0.202  24  -0.091 20  0.45 
     Hours  -0.099  26  -0.035 32  0.35 
     CPI  0.184  19  0.051 25  0.28 
        
Hamilton measure  1.000 1  1.000 1   
     Industrial production  -0.005  24  -0.002 11  0.41 
     Hours  -0.002  26  -0.001 24  0.39 
     CPI  0.003  13  0.001 2  0.25 
        
Gas price adjusted for the cost 
of shortages  1.000 1  1.000 2   
     Industrial production  -0.072  25  -0.091 20  1.27 
     Hours  -0.038  27  -0.035 32  0.92 
     CPI  0.084  20  0.051 2  0.61 
        
Consumer sentiment about gas  1.000 3  1.000 1   
     Industrial production  -0.002  27  -0.003 31  1.67 
     Hours  -0.001  27  -0.002 37  1.97 
     CPI  0.002  15  0.001 2  0.30 
 
Note: The impulse responses are based on vector autoregressions with monthly data. The variables include: (1) a selected oil 
price measure, (2) industrial production, (3) hours, (4) the headline CPI, (5) nominal wages, and (6) the federal funds rate.  
The VARs included six lags and a linear time trend. Shocks to oil prices are defined using a standard Cholesky 
decomposition with oil ordered first.  The oil shocks are standardized to be the same size in each sample period.  The 
standard deviations for the shocks to each oil price measure are as follows: The nominal gas price shock is .013 in the early 
period and .038 in the late period.  The shock to the Hamilton measure is .797 in the early period and 1.751 in the late period.  
The shock to the gas price adjusted for the cost of shortages is .045 in the early period and .038 in the late period.  The shock 
to gasoline sentiment is 1.364 in the early period and 2.028 in the late period.    43
Table 2 
 

















changes, annual rate) 
 






1985   100  4.3  100 
1986 to 
2007   100  2.1  100  Goods and 
services 
1986 to 
2009Q3   100  2.5  100 
          
1967 to 
1985   37  9.2  54 
1986 to 
2007   30  5.0  51  . . Goods 
1986 to 
2009Q3   30  5.6  50 
          
1967 to 
1985   4.0    38.1  22 
1986 to 
2007    3.5   19.2  14  . . Motor 
vehicles 
1986 to 
2009Q3    3.3   24.9  16 
 
Note: Data are from the National Income and Product Accounts.  Share of GDP volatility attributable to each component is 
calculated as 100 less the variance of growth contribution of GDP excluding each component relative to the variance of total 
GDP. Figures for the early period exclude 1970Q4, when a long strike severely reduced motor vehicle output and sales.   Figure 1.  Petroleum Prices 
January 1967 through March 2010 
 
                         Panel A:  Price indexes                                                           Panel B:  Real price indexes 
 










Log index (1990 = 100)
Gasoline CPI
Crude oil PPI (W561)
Refiners acquisition cost - imported crude oil
        










Log index (1990 = 100)
Gasoline CPI
Crude oil PPI (W561)
Refiners acquisition cost - imported crude oil
 
 
Note:  Data come from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The real indexes normalize the changes in petroleum prices by the 
changes in headline consumer price inflation.  Refiners acquisition cost data begin in 1974.  For each series x, the log index is 




Figure 2.  Real Gasoline Prices 
January 1967 through March 2010 
 









Log index (1990 = 100)
Gasoline CPI
Gasoline CPI adjusted for shortages
 
 
Note.  The dashed line represents the CPI for gasoline augmented with the shadow cost of waiting time in gas lines in 1973, 
1974, and 1979 as estimated by Frech and Lee (1987). The log index is calculated as in figure 1. 
  44Figure 3.  Consumer Sentiment toward Gasoline 
 
Share of respondents to the Thomson Reuters/University of Michigan Survey of Consumer Sentiment that cite high gasoline 
prices or shortages of gasoline as reasons that car buying conditions are poor 
 
January 1970 through April 2010 











Note. The gasoline price question was asked on a quarterly basis prior to January 1978 and the series was extrapolated to a 
monthly frequency by the authors.  
  45 Figure 4.  Responses of Consumption to Two Gasoline Shocks 
 
          Shock to the gas price                                                 Shock to sentiment toward gasoline    .                           
          





































































































































Note. Solid dots indicate periods in which the responses are more than 2 standard deviations from zero, and open circles 
indicate periods in which the responses are between 1 and 2 standard deviations from zero. 
  46Figure 5.  Motor Vehicle Industry in the U.S. Economy 
                            
                          Panel A: Output                                          Panel B: Manufacturing Value Added 
                           1967Q1 through 2009Q4                                                                   1967 through 2007                                                           
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Share of total GDP
Share of goods manuf. value added
 
 
Note. Dashed lines represent 95% confidence intervals for the sample means in two periods: 1967 to 1985, and 1986 to 2007.  
Expenditure shares are based on nominal data.  For value added, motor vehicles and parts is defined on a NAICS basis from 
1977 through 2007; earlier periods are plotted as best changes from the SIC definition.  Goods manufacturing includes 





Figure 6.  Vehicle Distance Traveled per Household 
 
January 1970 to October 2009 















Note. Data on vehicle miles are from Traffic Volume Trends, Office of Highway Policy Information in the Department of 
Transportation.  Data on the number of households in the United States are from the U.S. Census Bureau.  Data were 
smoothed with a 12-month moving average. 
  47Figure 7.  Average Fuel Economy for the U.S. Light Vehicle Stock 
 
December 1970 to December 2009 
 
















Note. Data from the Transportation Energy Databook: Edition 28, U.S. Department of Energy.  Data points for light trucks 





Figure 8.  Domestic Sales Shares for Selected Vehicle Segments 
Percent of domestic vehicles sold 
 
              January 1972 through December 1984                                           January 1996 through November 2009 









       







Full-size trucks, vans and utilities
Small cars and cross utilities
 
 
Note:  Shares are calculated from U.S. sales of domestic light vehicles.  Domestic light vehicles are defined as vehicles 
produced in North America.  The category “small cars” include compact and subcompact cars; “standard cars” include full 
size and luxury cars.  Cross-utility vehicles are small utility vehicles assembled on a car chassis.   
 
  48Figure 9.  Responses to a Segment-shifting Shock to Sales 
 


















































                              
























































Note. Graphs show impulse responses from the production model presented in equations (2) through (9).  
  49Figure 10.  Domestic Days’ Supply of Selected Vehicle Segments 
 
               January 1972 through December 1984                                        January 1996 through November 2009 










   








full-size trucks, vans and utilities
Small cars and cross-utilities
 
 
Note:  Days’ supply is calculated with end of month inventories and the three-month moving average of sales.  Inventories 
include finished vehicles held at dealerships, assembly plants and vehicles in transit.  Domestic vehicles refer to vehicles 
produced in North America.  “Small cars” include compact and subcompact cars, and “standard cars” include full size and 




Figure 11.  Variance of Domestic Days’ Supply across Vehicle Segments 
 
January 1972 through December 2009 










Note: Domestic days’ supply is calculated from U.S. inventories and sales of vehicles assembled in North America.  Variance 
is calculated across 5 car segments (subcompact, compact, intermediate, full-size, and luxury) and 6 light truck segments 
(compact vans, full-size vans, compact pickups, full-size pickups, cross-utility vehicles, and standard utility vehicles). 
  50Figure 12.  Responses to a Shock to Consumer Sentiment toward Gasoline 
 
Combined sample: 1972 through 2009 
 
 









































































                                
Note. Dashed lines enclose 95% confidence intervals. 
  51Figure 13.  Responses to a Shock to Consumer Sentiment toward Gasoline 
 
Split samples: 1972 to 1985 and 1986 to 2009 
 






















































































Note. Solid dots indicate periods in which the responses are more than 2 standard deviations from zero, and open circles 
indicate periods in which the responses are between 1 and 2 standard deviations from zero. 
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